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[Crim. No. 11533. In Bank.

Feb. 28,1968]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GENOVEVO
ROSALES, Defendant and Appellant.
[la-ld] Arrest-Without Warrant-Compliance With Law-Effect
of Failure.-The arrest of defendant by a parole officer and
three other officers was justified by the suspension of his parole
and the order of the Adult Authority that he be returned to
custody (Pen. Code, §§ 3060,3061), but his arrest, at the house
where they had reason to believe he would be, was vitiated,
where the officers, none of whom were known to defendant,
failed to explain their purpose or demand admittance (Pen.
Code, § 844), but opened the door, which was unlocked, and
walked straight in, and where there was no evidence to justify
a belief that compliance with Pen. Code, § 844, would have
increased the officers' peril, frustrated the an-est, or resulted
in the destruction of evidence.
[2] Id.-Without Warrant-Making Known Official Character.For a police officer merely to identify himself as such before
entering a house to make an an-est could constitute substantial
compliance with Pen. Code, § 844, only if the sun-ounding circumstances made the officers' purpose clear to the occupants
or showed that a demand for admittance would be futile;
thus, there was no substantial compliance where a parole
officer and three other officers, about to make an indoors an-est
of defendant, merely told a girl who passed them at the entrance that they were police officers, without announcing their
purpose or demanding entry before going in.

I.
t

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Arrest, § 42; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 69
etseq.
McK. Dig. References: [1,3-6] An-est, § 13; [2] Arrest, § 14.
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[3] IeL-Without Warrant-Compliance With Law-"Breaking."Pen. Code, § 844, requiring admittance to be demanded and explained by a peace officer before he may break into a house to
make an arrest, is a codification of the common law, and at
the very least precludes unannounced entries that would be
considered "breaking" as that term is used in defining common
law burglary.. Thus, opening a door or window, even if not
locked, or not even latched, or pulling open a screen door held
closed only by a spring, is a "breaking" within the meaning
of the statute (disapproving, to the extent contrary hereto,
People v. Feeley (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 100, 105 [3 Cal.Rptr.
529]).
[4] Id.-Without Warrant-Compliance With Law-Parole Violators.-An order to retake a parolee must be executed in ''like
manner as ordinary criminal process" (Pen. Code, § 3061), and
thus, in the making of a house arrest, the fact that the
arrestee, as a parole violator, was an "escape and fugitive
from justicl;l" under Pen. Code, § 3064, did not excuse noncompliance with Pen. Code, § 844, requiring the police to demand
and explain their admittance before breaking in to make the
arrest.
[5] Id-Without Warrant;-Compliance With Law-Purpose.Every householder, good and bad, guilty or innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest
against un.awful invasion of the home, and Pen. Code, § 844,
requiring peace officers to demand Ilnd explain their admittance
before breaking in to make an arrest, is designed to protect
such fundamental rights, by precluding violent resistance to
unexplained entries and safeguarding innocent persons who
may also be present on the premises.
[6] Id.-Without Warrant-Compliance With Law-When Excused.-Noncompliance with Pen. Code, § 844, requiring peace
officers to demand and explain their admittance before breaking in to make an arrest, may be excused when the officer
acts on a reasonable and good faith belief that compliance
would increase his peril, frustrate an arrest, or permit the
destruction of evidence, but it may not be generally assumed
that certain classes of persons subject to arrest are more likely
than others to do these things, and such belief must be based
on the facts of the particular case.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph L. Call, Judge. Reversed.
[3] Entry and search of premises for purpose of arresting one .
without search warrant, note, 9 A.L.R. 263.
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Prosecution for possession of heroin. Judgment of conviction reversed.
Genovevo Rosales, in pro. per., and Joseph C. Battaglia,
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and Brian Amer, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction of possession of heroin. (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11500.) The prosecution was based on the discovery of
heroin on defendant's person at the time of his arrest.
Defendant contends that the heroin was obtained by an
unconstitutional search and seizure by the arresting officers.
Defendant and Fred Berru were arrested in a house in the
Pacoima area of Los Angeles County. They were apprehended
by Parole Officer Damerell, San Fernando Police Officer Barbarick, and two other police officers. Officer Barbarick had
received information that defendant and Berru were arranging sales of heroin by telephone at the house where they were
arrested. He got in touch with Parole Officer Damerell and
learned that both suspects were parolees who had violated
their paroles by failure to report and that the Adult Authority had suspended defendant's parole and issued an all
points bulletin for his arrest. The officers then went to the
house to arrest defendant for parole violation. Officers Barbarick and Damerell went to the front door, and the other
officers covered the back of the house. Before entering, one
officer saw Berru through a front bedroom window and
another officer saw defendant through the front screen door.
Defendant was sitting on a couch with his back to the door.
Officers Barbarick and Damerell quickly entered the house
and accosted defendant. Just before they arrested defendant
they passed a girl and told her that they were police officers
but they did not announce their purpose or demand entry
before going into the house.
There is some evidence that the girl was related to Berru,
but there is no evidence of her age, or whether she lived at the
house, was visiting or just arriving for a visit. It does not
appear whether the officers were in uniform. Damerell was not
the parole officer of either Berru or Rosales, and there is no
evidence that either knew who he or the other officers were.
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Damerell testified that before he entered the house he believed
that the screen door was closed but that the wooden door was
open. 1
[Ia] Although the prosecution did not elicit sufficient
details of Officer Barbarick's information on defendant's current narcotics activities to show he had reasonable cause to
'believe that defendant was guilty of a new narcotics offense,
defendant's arrest was justified by the suspension of his
parole and the order of the Adult Authority that he be
returned to custody. (Pen. Code, §§ 3060, 3061.) It also
appears that before they entered the house, the officers had
reasonable cause to believe that defendant was there. The
crucial question, therefore, is whether the officers' failure to
explain their purpose and demand admittance as required by
~ection 844 of the Pcnal Code:! vitiated the arrest. We hold
that it did.
[2] Vie note at the outset that the ofiict:'r::;' identification of
themselves to the girl did not constitute substantial compliance with section 844. 'l'hat section requires that an officer
explain his purpose before demanding admitta11ce, not merely
that he identify himself as an ofiicer. "'fhe burUen of making
an express announcement [of purpose) is certainly slight."
(Miller V" United States (1958) 357 U.S. 301, 309 [2 L.Ed.2d
1332,1338,78 S.Ct.1l90).)
Such identification alone could constitute substantial compliance with section 844 only if the surrounding circumstances made the officers' purpose clear to the occupants or
showed that a demand for admittance would be futile.
[Ib] There is nothing in the record to show that any of the
occupants or even the girl knew that the officers' purpose was
to arrest the defendant or understood that they were demanding admittance. 3
IDefendant testified that there was no screen door and that the wooden
door was closed.
We note that Police Offieer Olsen testified at the preliminary hearing
that the girl was stopped as she entered the house and that she opened
fhc door for the offieera aft.er thcy had i<1entified themselves. This evidence was not before the trial court when it determined the validity of
the cntry. since the defeudnnt electe<1 not to IlrOcecd on tile pr('liminary
hearing retord.
2" '1'0 make an arrest . . . in all cases a peace-officer. may break open
the door or window of the house in whieh the pel'son to be arrested is, or
in whidl they have reasonable groun<1s for believing him to be. after
having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired."
SIn People ". Limon (1067) 255 Cal.App.2d 519 [63 Cal.Rptr. 91].
cited by the Attorney General. the entry was held valid on the theory that
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[3] The Attorney General contends that since the officers
did no more than open an unlocked screen door and walk in,
no "breaking" within the meaning of the statute occurred.
'Ve do not agree with this contention. Although the common
law rule was first articulated to regulate entry by force, it is
not limited to entries effected by physical violence. Section
844 is a codification of the common law. (People v. Maddox
(1956) 46 Ca1.2d 301, 306 [394 P.2d 6].) At the very least, it
covers unannounced entries that would be considered breaking
as that term is used in defining common law burglary.
(Rest.2d Torts (1965) § 206, com. b; Blakey, The Rule of
Annollncement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States
and Ker v. California (1964) 112 D.Pa.L.Rev. 499, 505;
Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant (1924) 22 Mich.L.Rev.
798,806.) As so defined, no more is needed "than the opening
of a door or window, even if not locked, or not even latched.
Pulling open a screen door held closed only by a spring is
sufficient." (R. Perkins, Criminal Law (1957) 149, 150.)4
[Ie] Since in the present case the only evidence before the
trial court showed that the officers entered by opening a
closed, unlocked door, the prosecution did not discharge; its
burden of establishing the legality of the entry. (See People
v. Roberts (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 374, 377 [303 P.2d 721] ; People
v.Car·swell (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 602,607 [335 P.2d 99].)
[4] The fact tbat defendant was a parole violator deemed
the defendant had seen the officers and knew their identity and that the
announcement would have been a futile gesture. No such inference can
be drawn in .this c.ase.
4The Attorney General has cited several California cases in support of
his contention that an entry by opening a closed, unlocked door is not a
breaking. People v. Barallko (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 189, 194 [20 Cal.
Rptr. 139], and People v. Chacon (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 7~9, 743 r35
CaJ.Rptr. 799], involved entry aiter the deil'ndant or a third person had
voluntarily opened the door. In People v. Littlejohn (1957) 148 Cal.
App.2d 786, 790 [307 P.2d 425], the ofi1cers showed their badges and
placed the two defendants under arrest while facing them through a
screen door, and then opened the screen door. The announcement and
identificatioll were made before entry and the statute was eomplied with.
To the extent that People v. Feeley (1960) 179 Cal.App.2<1 ]00, 10:; [3
Cal.Rptr. 529], is contrary to our holding herein, it is disapproved. The
federal courts are in diRagreement as to the interpretation to be given
the similar federal statute. (18 U.S.C. § 3109.) At one extreme are cases
indicating that any entry withont permission is a br('akillg. (E.g., 11 air
v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 894, 89.7 [110 App.D.C. 153].)
At the opposite extreme is Sabbath v. United States. (9th Cir. 1967)
380 F.2d J08, 111, certiorari granted, 389 U.S. 1003 f19 L.Ed.~d 598,
88 S.('t. 570], which sanctioned (,!ltry by oncllillg a clnsed, 1111loo.k('<1
door. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has given the sam!'
interpretation to section 844. (William,. v. United States (9th Cir. J9:;9)
273 1'.2d 78], 793·794.) In the present case it is unneeessary to decide
whether any entry without permission is a hreaking.
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an "escape and fugitive from justice" (Pen. Code, § 3064)
did not excuse noncompliance with section 844, for the Legislature has expressly provided tl1at an order to retake a parolee
must be executed "in like manner as ordinary criminal
process" (Pen. Code, § 3061). Even an escape from custody,
however, does not alone justify entrance into a house to make
an arrest without explanation of purpose and demand for
admittance. (Pen. Code, § 855; see also Pen. Code, § 1531 ;
People v. A.rellano (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 389, 390-392 [48
Cal.Rptr. 686]; People v. Stephens (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d
113,114-117 {57 Cal.Rptr. 66].)
[5] Section 844 is designed to protect fundamental rights.
"Decisions in both the federal and state courts have recognized, as did the English courts, that the requirement is of the
essence of the substantive protections which safeguard individual liberty." (Ker v. Oalifornia (1962) 374 U.S. 23, 49
[10 L.Ed.2d 726, 747, 83 S.Ot. 1623], Brennan, J. dissenting.)
The statute reflects more than concern for the rights of
those accused of crime. It serves to preclude violent resistance
to unexplained entries and to protect the security of innocent
persons who may also be present on premises where an arrest
is made:! "Weare duly mindful of the reliance that society
must place for achieving law and order upon the enforcing
agencies of the criminal law. But insistence on observance by
law officers· of traditional fair procedural requirements is,
from the long point of view, best calculated to contribute to
that end. However much in a particular case insistence upon
such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the
benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law
proves that tolerance of short-cut methods in law enforcement
impairs its enduring effectiveness. The requirement of prior
notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a
home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given
grudging application . . . . Every householder, the good and
the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest against unlawful
Ii" The law of ELgland, which is founded on reason, never authorises
such outrageous acts as the breaking open every door and lock in a man's
house without any declaration of the authority undcr which it is done.
Such conduct must tend to create fcar and dismay, and breaches of the
peace by provoking resistance. This doctrine would not only be attended
with great mischief to the persons against whom process is issued, but
to other persons, also, since it must equally hold good in cases of process
upon escape, where the party has taken refuge in the house of a
stranger." (Heath, J., in Ratcliffe v. Burton (1802) 3 Bos. & Pul. 223,
230,127 Eng. Rep. 123. 126·127.)
.
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invasion of the house. The petitioner could not be lawfully
arrested in his home by officers breaking in without first giving him notice of their authority and purpose. Because the
petitioner did not receive that notice before the officers broke
the door to invade his home, the arrest was unlawful, and the
evidence seized should have been suppressed." (Miller v.
United States (1958) 357 U.S. 301, 313-314 [2 L.Ed.2d 1332,
, 1340-1341, 78 8.Ct. 1190]; cf. Ker v. California, supra, 374
U.S. 23, 40-41 [10 L.Ed.2d 726, 742-743], where "exigent
circumstances" excused compliance with the notice and demand requirements.)
[6] Noncompliance with section 844 may nevertheless be
excused when the officer acts on a reasonable and good faith
belief that compliance would increase his peril, frustrate an
arrest, or permit the destruction of evidence. Such a belief,
however, must be based on the facts of the particular case. It
cannot be justified by a general assumption that certain
classes of persons subject to arrest are more likely than others
to resist arrest, attempt to escape, or destroy evidence. (People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 586, 588 [63 Cal.Rptr. 10,
432 P.2d 706] and cases cited.)
[Id] The Attorney General contends that the officers were
excused from compliance with section 844 to prevent defendant's escape. The facts do not support this contention. Four
officers went to the house and covered its front and back.
Before entering they saw both defendant and Berru and
observed no suspicious activity. Compliance with section 844
would have afforded defendant and Berru a few seconds at
most to take evasive action. There is no evidence that would
justify a belief that such compliance would have increased the
officers' peril, frustrated the arrest, or resulted in the
destruction of evidence.
Since the entry was unlawful, the search of defendant's
person was illegal. The heroin discovered thereby should
therefore have been excluded.
The judgment is reversed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
BURKE, J.-I dissent. The majority, by adopting an
unduly restrictive view regarding what constitutes exigent
circumstances excusing strict compliance with the demand
and explanation requirements of Penal Code section 844,1
IPenal Code section 844 provides: "To make an arrest .•. a peace
oftieer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the
person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for
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conclude that the officers' violation of that section vitiated the
arrest and rendered the search illegal. I do not agree and am
satisfied that the Court of Appeal and trial court in this case
properly determined, expressly or impliedly, that under the
circumstances here pr('sent literlll eompliance with the formal
requirements of section 844 was unnecessary and the officers'
conduct was reasonabl(·.
This court pointed out in Pcoplc v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301,
306 [394 P.2d 6], that the primary purpose of the constitutional gurantees regarding searclles and seizures is to prevent
unreasonable iuvasions of the l)ecurity of the people in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, and that compliance with
the demand and expllluation r('quirellH'nts of section 844 is
excused if the facts known to the officer before lIis entry were
l)ufficiellt to support his good fllith bclit·f that compliance
would have increased his peril or frust.rated the arrest. (See
also Ker \T. Califm''IIill, 374 HR. 23,37-41 [10 IJ.Ed.2d 726,740.
743, 83 S.Ct. 1623); Peoplc v. Gasfclo, 67 Ca1.2d 586, 588
[63 Cul.Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706) ; Peoplc v. Cart'illo, 64 Cal.2d
387, 391 [50 Cal.Rptr. 185, 412 P.2d 377) ; People v. Potter,
144 Ca1.App.2d 350, 356 (300 P.2d 889).) Here the facts
known to the officers before their entry amply warranted such
a belief.
The police :offieers and the parole officer went to t}le
llOuse in which they had been informed defendant was liv·
ing for the purpose of arrestil1g him and his companion
Berru for parole violation. According to Parole Officer
Damerell, two of the officers went to the back of the house
because they were "fearful of fligllt" by defendant and
Berru. Damerell and Officer Barbarick wcnt to the front door.
There the wooden door was open, but the screen door was
closed. Before entering, the officers observed Berru in a bedroom with his wife or former wife and saw defendant on a
couch in the living room several feet from the front door with
llis back to the officers.
A t the doorway thp officers identified themselves to a girl.
Damerell testified that "'Ve were moving as quickly as possi.
ble because we anticipated a 1 possible es('ape attempt." Bar.
barick and Damerell entered the house and arrested defendant
and Berm. A search of defendant's person revealed heroin.
According to defendant, it was dark outside at the time of the
,arrest.

r

believing him to be, after having' demanded admittallce and explained
the purpose for which admittance is desired."

)

Information obtained by the officers from the Santa Barbara parole office regarding defendant's prior criminal record
and of his and Berru's having absconded from parole.
together with additional matters known to them including in
part their observations indicating that defendant and Berru
were both in the same llouse in separate rooms, fully justified
a belief that defendant and Berru would resist arrest or
resume their flight if atrorded any opportunity to do so. Surprise was manifestly important in minimizing danger to the
officers and preventing escape by the two parole absconders.
In my opinion the Court of Appeal in the present case
properly concluded tbat •• The officers. by their prompt and
efficient actions, violated no basic constitutional or statutory
guarantee by getting inside of thc house, where they ,vere
entitled to be, more quickly than they would have had they
complied" strictly with the formal provisions of section 844.
I would affirm the judgment.
McComb, J. t and Mosk, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 28,
1968. McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

